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14 October 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : SA/DCI/IA

SUBJECT : NSC Meeting on Lebanon and East-West Relations,
15 October 1982 - *140000*.

1. We have been told that Secretary Shultz will give the presentations on both subjects.

- Lebanon. This apparently will be a status report on efforts to negotiate the withdrawal of all foreign forces and of the President's peace initiative. The DDI is preparing an updated set of talking points on the internal Lebanese situation, the status of withdrawals, PLO returnees, and Arafat's discussions with King Hussein. For tonight you have the latest reporting we have along with [] memos and talking points covering the withdrawal issue and the bigger picture in the Middle East. 25X1
- East-West Policy. Shultz plans to brief on the results of his discussions with various West Europeans in New York regarding our efforts to smooth over differences as a result of the sanctions. [] and the DDI will provide you the latest we have on the reactions of the various West European governments and the steps they have taken. 25X1

2. Please let me know if there is any other material you would like to have for the meeting.

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JCS review completed.

State Dept. review
completed

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Lebanon

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A

TALKING POINTS
NSC on Lebanon
15 October 1982

- New President committed to demilitarizing and uniting Beirut Christians
- Lebanese Army took up new positions in East Beirut to begin disarming 20,000 Phalangists
- Over last week, arrested and destroyed identity cards of 1,500 Palestinians in West Beirut
- Presidential staff of 4 selected - 3 Lebanese citizens who have lived in US recently - 1 was Phalangist rep in Washington - 2 World Bank officials
- We already see significant return of Palestinians from camps in Syria to Bekaa Valley in Lebanon - on report as high as 2000 - certainly several hundred
- We think it very likely that for a long time an armed Palestinian presence will remain in the northern, Syrian occupied area. This presence likely to grow through returnees from the Beirut evacuation. Palestinian civilians from Beirut and south Lebanon, intimidated by central government activity, will probably also find their way north. Over time, this will feed armed militias with new recruits. Syria will control reinfiltration and supply routes which will make this a Syrian zone of influence.
- In a similar manner in the south, pro-Israeli Lebanese elements such as Haddad's militia will remain with the Israelis.
- In both areas in the north and south the Lebanese government will exercise little real influence.

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- Even if sustained diplomatic pressure by the US leads to a complete Syrian and Israeli withdrawal sometime later, both the PLO and Haddad will remain active until the Lebanese army becomes more capable of dealing with them.
- The net result of these events is likely to be a continued Palestinian/Syrian zone of influence in the north and a central Lebanese government/Israeli southern security zone. As an intermediate range situation while Lebanese central army strength slowly grows, this situation seems "tolerable" from the standpoint of US interests.
- Prospect of prolonged armed Palestinian presence in north suggests that MNF should not be linked to total success, and establishing a mechanism or a trigger point for earlier MNF withdrawal - leaving final cleanup to Lebanese Army.

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ISRAEL-LEBANON
Talking Points for the DCI
(As of 0900EDT, 15 October 1982)

Lebanon: Internal Developments

Clashes between Phalangist militia and Druze villagers-- supporters of Walid Junblat's Progressive Socialist Party--continued yesterday in the hills southeast of Beirut as Lebanese security forces became involved.

- In an effort to restore order both the Lebanese Internal Security Forces and the Lebanese Army joined in the fighting.
- Israeli Army units are also attempting to control the fighting--apparently with limited success.
- Israeli units east of Beirut are restricting the movement of Phalangist militia along the Beirut Damascus highway

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Search Operations

The Lebanese Army launched security sweeps in West Beirut on Wednesday and Thursday following a one day suspension of activity. Lebanon's military prosecutor said yesterday that 1,441 people had been arrested since the Army began its search operations ten days ago.

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Beirut Muslims have complained about the unequal treatment by the government of West and East Beirut. They charge that the Lebanese Army is acting like an army of occupation during its clean-up operations in the Muslim-dominated west, while the Christian-dominated eastern sector of the city has thus far gone untouched.

- President Jumayyil has said that the army operations aimed at demilitarizing and uniting Beirut will extend to East Beirut.

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- Last night Lebanese Army units moved into the outskirts of East Beirut, setting up roadblocks and checking identity papers. They will reportedly begin search operations in the city today.
- Although this move has been greeted enthusiastically by Lebanese Muslims, it remains to be seen how assiduously the Army performs its duties in East Beirut. The Lebanese Forces are likely to resist any attempt to disarm them.

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New Government

Local reactions to the new Lebanese cabinet are generally favorable although some Shi'a Muslims are complaining that the 10-member cabinet is not representative. Only one Shia was named to the cabinet.

- In a surprising show of Maronite solidarity, former President Sulayman Franjiyah, arch rival of the Jumayyil clan, called the president to offer his support to the new government.

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President Jumayyil's scheduled trip to the US from 16-19 October, will probably delay formal Parliamentary approval of the new government until after his return to Lebanon.

- Because the new cabinet does not include any members of Parliament there is concern that an adversarial relationship may develop between it and the National Assembly.

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LEBANON: Interfactional Fighting


After several days of sporadic violence in the Israeli-occupied mountain region southeast of Beirut, military exchanges between the militias of the Christian Phalange Party and the Druze-dominated Progressive Socialist Party flared again yesterday. The area of the violence last week has widened to include several additional villages, and the intense fighting has touched off a wave of kidnappings on both sides. Prime Minister Wazzan, reacting to appeals from local political leaders, has indicated that efforts are under way to have the Lebanese Army assume security responsibilities in the area. [redacted]

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Comment: Lebanese authorities are reluctant to deploy the Army in the region as long as Israeli forces are present, arguing that Israel is responsible for maintaining order. The government also may not yet be ready to test the fragile authority of the Army against the superior Phalange militia force. The local population believes the Israelis instigated the clashes in order to give them an excuse to stay in Lebanon. [redacted]

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Special Analysis

SYRIA: Views on the Peace Process

The Syrians, who have pretensions to a role of leadership in the Arab world, almost certainly were disappointed by the lack of any special mention of Syria or the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights in Washington's recent Middle East peace initiative. Damascus has tended to play a spoiling role in past peace schemes and has considerable potential for continuing to do so. For the time being, however, President Assad's regime has been careful not to comment too critically on the plan, and it probably will wait to see the general direction of events in the area before committing itself to a firm policy. []

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Damascus has good reason to adopt a low profile. Syrian forces, dealt heavy blows by the Israelis, have been expelled from Beirut and are in a more threatened position in the rest of Lebanon. A Phalange-oriented government has come to power in Beirut with the intention of eliminating the remaining Syrian presence. []

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PLO chief Arafat's determination to resist Syrian efforts to gain control of PLO policies has been reinforced by Syria's inability to prevent the PLO's expulsion from Beirut. Moreover, any reinvigoration of the peace process could bring Jordan into discussions with Israel on behalf of the PLO in a way that diminishes Syria's role and further weakens Assad's bargaining position. []

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Syrian Objectives

Despite these setbacks, Syria's goals in any peace agreement are unchanged. First and foremost, Damascus seeks restoration of the Golan Heights to Syrian sovereignty. It also wants a settlement of the Palestinian problem under terms acceptable to the PLO. []

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Syria also would expect to be recognized as a key participant in any Middle East settlement--one capable of blocking a settlement if it were not along acceptable lines. Consequently, Syria seeks maximum control over the PLO in order to ensure that this leverage will serve Syrian, and not Jordanian, interests. []

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Neither the proposals of the recent Arab summit in Fez, Morocco, nor the US initiative meet these needs, and Assad will be content for now to stand aside, expecting one or both plans to fail in the face of Israeli intransigence. If the initiatives do founder, Syria will be better able than most other Arab states to escape being tainted by association with the proposals. 25X1

If the proposals seem to be making progress and Syrian interests are ignored, however, the Syrians probably will act as spoilers. They may in fact be drawn into this role if large numbers of radical Palestinians reject the current peace process and seek the leadership of a major Arab state to advance their cause. 25X1

To scuttle any talks, Damascus could provoke a political or military crisis in Lebanon to ensure strong Israeli reaction. Alternatively, the Syrians could instigate radical Palestinian action against the Israelis or encourage radical Palestinians to foment trouble in Jordan and elsewhere. 25X1

External Pressure on Damascus

Other countries will have only a minimum effect on the approach Assad chooses. The USSR has hailed the Fez plan for allotting it a role in the peace process, but the Soviets probably would not push Damascus to accept the plan if Syria's basic aims were not being met. Moscow is likely to support and may encourage efforts to impede the US plan, but this probably would not have more than marginal impact. 25X1

Saudi Arabia's financial support gives it some leverage. Assad, however, almost certainly will reject Riyadh's demarches without reciprocal concessions by Israel. 25X1

The Syrians clearly are unwilling at this point to reject the US initiative outright, but they will be difficult to bring on board. If they try to become spoilers, their success will depend largely on the extent and nature of Israel's reaction to their provocations. 25X1

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A/NIO/NESA

14 October 1982

Talking Points: Possible Resumption of Israeli-Soviet Diplomatic Relations

While the possibility of such a resumption of relations cannot be ruled out entirely, there is little reason to believe that Tel Aviv is seriously considering such a step at the current time.

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- The Israelis may be encouraging rumors of a resumption of relations as a signal to Washington that not all of Israel's eggs are in one basket.
 - The Israelis will give the idea little serious consideration, however, unless convinced that the move would bring them distinct benefits, e.g. guarantees from Moscow concerning a greatly liberalized exit policy for Soviet Jews.

Moscow, for its part, would probably perceive benefits in a resumption of relations.

- Its influence in the region clearly has suffered. The US is negotiating PLO and Syrian withdrawals from Lebanon, with the Saudis attempting to use their economic leverage to influence the Syrians.
- Moscow also may see opportunities in an expansion of its physical presence in the region. An embassy in Tel Aviv would give Moscow more eyes and ears in the area.

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We believe the Israelis would lose little militarily if they disengaged to the 40-45 kilometer line. They would retain an ability to strike at the Syrians in the Biqa' with little difficulty. But the Israelis would probably see major political difficulties in accepting a disengagement.

- They would argue that it does not address the problem of the remaining Palestinian forces in northern Lebanon, a goal which Begin and Sharon have consistently argued is of equal if not greater importance than Syrian and Israeli withdrawal.
- A limited disengagement brings Tel Aviv no closer to achieving its political goals in Lebanon -- arranging a peace treaty and securing the withdrawal of the Syrian and the PLO -- and thus opens Begin to internal criticism that he has expended significant resources and achieved little in return.

If a limited disengagement along the lines outlined above could be achieved, we believe it would accelerate the trend towards zones of influence because both sides would be reluctant to make further withdrawals and there would be little political or military leverage available to force them to do so.

- Israel is constructing numerous permanent support facilities and fortifications in the 40-45 kilometer zone and is assisting Major Haddad's Christian militia to expand its control in the security zone.
- Israel would argue that any further withdrawals could result only from direct negotiations with the government of Lebanon and would have to address Israel's security concerns.
- The Syrians could then cite the Israeli actions as justifying a continued Syrian presence in northern Lebanon.

Failure to move beyond a limited disengagement would have the following implications:

- An armed Palestinian presence will remain in the northern, Syrian-occupied area. This presence may increase by returnees from the Beirut diaspora. Palestinian civilians from Beirut and south Lebanon, intimidated by central government activity, will probably also find their way north. Over time, this will feed armed militias with new recruits.
- In a similar manner in the south, pro-Israeli Lebanese elements such as Haddad's militia will remain with the Israelis.

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- In both areas the Lebanese government will exercise little real influence.

Even if sustained diplomatic pressure by the US leads to a complete Syrian and Israeli withdrawal sometime later, both the PLO and Haddad will remain active until the Lebanese army becomes more capable of dealing with them.

- In this context, avoiding an open-ended MNF presence in Lebanon requires a decision to withdraw the MNF before the situation is finally resolved in all its dimensions.

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NIO/NESA

14 October 1982

Talking Points: Meeting with SecDef and SecState on 15 October
Lebanon Withdrawals

1. The State Department formulation for staged withdrawals from Lebanon, described in my memorandum of yesterday, is being challenged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are offering the following alternative. According to General Andy Cooley, JCS Chief of Planning, Secretary Weinberger supports this plan.

- The withdrawals seen by State during Stage 1 are insufficient. In the JCS conception, not only should the Israelis withdraw to the 43 kilometer line, but the Syrians should withdraw to the northern portion of the Biqa Valley. The 5 kilometers envisaged for the Syrians is simply not sufficient.
- The "single line" deployment of a 10,500 man MNF or UNIFIL along the Beirut-Damascus road is both too large and incorrect militarily. JCS is proposing a one brigade force of around 5000 which would occupy key terrain features -- which any aggressor out to break the disengagement would be required to take. [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] The JCS is undertaking this key terrain analysis now. The 5000 man force may require augmentation by logistics elements and any standby fire support (such as US carrier neaby) required. JCS would far prefer a UNIFIL-supervised withdrawal process and force, but would concur in an MNF including US participation under these circumstances.
- As far as "Stage Two" is concerned -- described in the State paper as a 10-15,000 man force along or in the area south of 43 kilometers to the Israeli border -- the JCS does not wish to even consider this issue at this time. In their opinion, if disengagement is achieved in Phase I, then the problem of the south will better be left to diplomacy or a Lebanese-Israeli agreement. In any case, it cannot be considered in the present unclear situation.
- Finally, the JCS agrees with our assessment that conditions in north Lebanon are simply unpredictable at this time -- and the prospects are for a future Palestinian presence there. In their opinion, this matter should be left for time and a strengthened central Lebanese army to resolve.

2. JCS has received no reporting as yet from their military survey team which went to Beirut on 1 October. [redacted] 25X1
[redacted]

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25X1 [redacted] Essentially, the Lebanese do not seem sufficiently prepared to deal properly as yet.

3. Other than my suggestions to you regarding the necessity of considering the probability of long-term turmoil in north Lebanon, I do not believe we are required to take a position on the above issues. The JCS proposals sound reasonable to me, although DOD does have an ingrained motivation to keep the US troop commitment to the absolute minimum. Their internal assessment also indicates that any force that deploys outside Beirut will begin to take casualties, which they naturally take into account.

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INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT

7 October 1982

Lebanon: Possible Israeli and Syrian Withdrawals

We believe that moving towards a simultaneous, continuous withdrawal to the international borders is the preferred course of action. Neither Damascus nor Tel Aviv is prepared to accept this approach, however, and a phased disengagement is the only politically viable possibility.

A phased withdrawal has serious shortcomings. In our judgment, a phased disengagement would make sense only if it involved an Israeli pullback to the 40-45 kilometer line coupled with a Syrian withdrawal from the Metn and the Sannin ridgeline. The Israelis will want agreement for total PLO withdrawal in advance. Moreover, both sides would find this arrangement difficult to accept for a variety of other political and military reasons.

- A Syrian pullback from the Metn and Sannin ridgeline would place remaining Syrian forces in the Bika' Valley in a tactically untenable position. If Syria accepted such a disengagement, moreover, it would make sense militarily to withdraw its forces in the Bika' to Baalbek or to Syria. Such a move, however, would split Syrian forces dangerously and make mutual reinforcement in the event of an Israeli drive up the Bika' virtually impossible.

Because of the serious military drawbacks from the Syrian perspective, Damascus would probably accept such a move only if a strong monitoring force separating Israeli and Syrian positions was put in place.

- There are three possibilities for such a force. The Lebanese army is too weak and incapable of performing the task. UNIFIL forces or an expanded UN observer group would be clearly unacceptable to the Israelis. Only a greatly expanded Multinational Force with a mandate to patrol and enforce the disengagement would be acceptable to the Syrians and Israelis in this monitoring role. The Syrians, given the military risks involved, would almost certainly insist on such a force before agreeing to disengagement.

This assessment was prepared jointly by CIA/DDI and State/INR under the auspices of NIO/NESA. It was coordinated at the working level with DIA.

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 8151-82
8 October 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: NIO/NESA

SUBJECT: 7 October Meeting of Lebanon Steering Group

1. The purpose of this meeting was to hear the views of Phil Habib on the evolving Lebanese situation, and to discuss security and reconstruction issues.

2. Habib made the following points:

- There are essentially two sets of Lebanese problems: Lebanese government structural issues, and withdrawal of foreign forces.
- On withdrawals, all foreign parties more or less agree in principle. Hence, the immediate problem is that of the mechanics of bringing it about.
- The logical solution to withdrawal is a simultaneous scenario. For a variety of reasons, this is impractical to both Syrians and Israelis. Hence, a two-stage phased arrangement is the only serious practicality. For this to work, a "pre-cooked" final solution must be understood and agreed upon by all concerned before the first state of disengagement is agreed upon.
- In a two-phased scenario, Habib envisages probable deployment of an MNF, with or without US participation, roughly along the Beirut-Damascus road. Under any scenario, there will probably be a need for an MNF or UNIFIL after total withdrawal.
- Habib sees the optimum size of the Lebanese army as roughly 80,000 with a high degree of mobility. At least 1 year minimum will be required to attain this goal. He spoke positively about Amin Jumayyil, the consensus that has formed around him, and political will that he is now displaying.

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-- Habib would clearly like US forces to be permitted a more forward leaning role, but is resigned to their current disposition and conservative rules of engagement. In his terms, "all parties know we're chicken, and accept the problem."

3. The intelligence community assessment prepared for Ambassador Draper on the likely ultimate results of phased withdrawal is considerably more bearish about the implications of phased withdrawal. If true, the MNF should not be linked to total success, and a mechanism for earlier MNF withdrawal evolved. This assessment is attached.

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leaving to Lebanese Army*

Attachment:
Assessment

*Project of prolonged armed Palestinian
presence in north suggests that-*

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

NIC 8107-82
7 October 1982

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: [REDACTED] NIO/NESA

SUBJECT: A Six-Month Look Ahead - Middle East

The following is a non-coordinated projection of where four key Middle East crises will probably stand in roughly six months time - i.e. early April 1983. This assumes no major change in US policies on these issues.

A. Lebanon

- Beirut and its environs will have been decisively pacified. The central government will have consolidated effective control in this limited area.
- A phased Israeli-Syrian mutual withdrawal agreement (including armed PLO) will have been reached well before year's end. The initial phases will have occurred, and be sufficient to have brought about a disengagement of forces in the Bika' Valley. This disengagement, combined with agreement in principle for a total withdrawal, could permit withdrawal of the MNF from all Lebanon by the end of this year, if desired.
- Whether or not all Syrian and Israeli forces will have withdrawn, an armed Palestinian presence will either remain or return to the north and the northern Bika' Valley. This presence may increase by returnees from the Beirut diaspora. Palestinian civilians from Beirut and south Lebanon, intimidated by central government activity, will probably also find their way north - either directly or via Syria after expulsion from Lebanon. Over time, [this will feed armed militias with new recruits. All of this will permit a continued Syrian zone of influence, given their partial control of reinfiltration and supplies.]
- [In a similar manner in the south, Israeli troops may or may not remain in areas designated for final withdrawal. Armed Lebanese elements responsive to Israeli security needs for a cordon sanitaire

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will remain, either via a security agreement with the central Lebanese army or with continued existence of the Haddad militia. I suspect a combination of both will have occurred, although probably not an overt formal Lebanese-Israeli peace treaty by 1 April. 2'

- [The net result of these events will be a continued Palestinian/Syrian zone of influence in the north and a central Lebanese government/Israeli southern security zone. As an intermediate range situation while Lebanese central army strength slowly grows, this situation is "tolerable" from the point of view of US interests. 2³]

B. US Palestine Initiative

- Intermediate-range requirements of the US initiative are to narrow positions in the following areas:

1) The Arab consensus position must move from its present vague formulation of "security for all states in the region" to one which explicitly states an Arab willingness to recognize Israel under appropriate circumstances.

2) The Israelis must move towards a willingness to recognize the principle of territorial exchange in the West Bank/Gaza for recognition and security guarantees, as opposed to their present formulation of autonomy for inhabitants only.

- In six months, I believe it is realistic to anticipate one or two explicit Arab statements of a conditional willingness to recognize Israel in return for a complete withdrawal to the 1967 lines. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco are of course the prime candidates. This statement would not be sufficient for any Israeli change, but would increase pressures for some form of reciprocity.

- The Begin government will not have accepted, in six months, the principle of territorial exchange. However, serious debate will have increased in Israel on it, perhaps including the Likud.

- As debate in Israel intensifies, it will increasingly focus on differences between the Labor Party "Allon-plan" - which envisages an Israeli security belt including most of the Jordan valley - and the concept of "minor border rectifications" which previously comprised the American position.

- Overall, I suspect a narrowing of positions along the above lines will have occurred in six months time. If some modification in Israeli governing circles also transpires (i.e. perhaps dropping of Sharon or even emergence of a weak Labor coalition government) -

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- which is not predictable at this stage - then initial progress toward an ultimate solution will have been made.
- Egyptian-Israeli ties will continue to deteriorate if Begin stays in power. Cairo's ambassador will not return to Tel Aviv and the rhetoric on both sides will be shrill, especially if Arafat visits Egypt. A complete break in relations is unlikely, however.

C. Iran-Iraq

- All current indicators point towards continuing stalemate of the war effort. I suspect a relatively low-level border war of attrition will be continuing in six months time, with neither side significantly threatening the other. Under these circumstances, the war's continuation is tolerable from the point of view of American interest.
- The Iranian regime will probably continue to strengthen its grip on power. No opposition movement of the right or left has sufficient strength to change this situation. Petroleum exports are at a 1.5 million BBLS/day, even in the face of recent Iraqi air attacks on Kharg Island, and this output level will probably continue.
- Iranian subversive attempts in the Arab Gulf states have been uniformly inept - whether the Bahrain coup attempt or demonstrations in Mecca. Presumably, elements in the Iranian hierarchy will be continuing these efforts in six months time - probably with the same lack of success.
- No mitigation of hostility towards the United States is likely. There are increasing non-definitive indications of Iranian-Soviet friction - especially in the Afghanistan border area - and relations may have deteriorated further in six months time.

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

15 October 1982

Lebanon: Problems Facing President Jumayyil

Summary

Lebanese president Amin Jumayyil faces an up-hill struggle in his attempt to reestablish Lebanon's political and territorial integrity after seven years marked by civil war, anarchy, violence and foreign meddling. Following the assassination of his brother Bashir, Amin was elected president with the unprecedented backing of nearly all of Lebanon's confessionally-based factions. The conflicting interests of these groups, especially the demands of those who supported his late brother, means that the newly forged political consensus is fragile and much of his energies will be diverted into maintaining and strengthening his political support. []

In the month since assuming office, Jumayyil has made modest gains in returning war-ravaged Beirut to normal. The greater task still lies ahead, however, as 90 percent of the country is occupied by Israeli and Syrian forces, pockets of Palestinian fighters continue to operate in the north and east, extralegal militias function throughout the country, and interfactional violence rages only a few miles from the capital. []

During Jumayyil's visit to Washington, he hopes to further crystallize the extent of US commitment, both to Lebanon and to himself as its leader. He will want US moral and material support for the rebuilding of his country's institutions, especially the army, as well as extensive involvement in Lebanon's reconstruction effort. More importantly, he needs US diplomatic leverage to secure the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, and a continuing commitment to its territorial and political integrity. []

* * * * *

This memorandum was prepared by [] the Levant Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near East South/Asia Analysis. Information as of 15 October 1982 was used in its preparation. Questions and comments are welcome and should be directed to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, []

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Fragile Political Consensus

Lebanon's political landscape was changed dramatically by Israel's invasion on 6 June, and again by the assassination of president-elect Bashir Jumayyil on 14 September. The political leadership, shocked into cooperation by these events, has forged a consensus supporting Amin Jumayyil that appears to be the strongest in Lebanon since before the 1975-76 civil war. ☐

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The new spirit of accomodation is, nevertheless, fragile. Recent eruptions of interfactional violence in various parts of the country is indicative of the continued ascendancy of confessional and clan loyalties over Lebanese national identity. ☐

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Maintaining and strengthening this consensus will be a problem for Amin, who is not yet the master of his own house. His most pressing problem is to establish control over the powerful Phalange militia, especially hardcore militants put into powerful positions by Bashir. These elements have little use for Amin, who they see as representing the bankrupt politics of the old guard. Fears that Amin will not carry through on Bashir's policies may lead these hardliners to consider a coup. ☐

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Other Christian and Muslim factions have expressed a willingness to work with Amin. This is not the result of personal loyalty or particular confidence in his leadership, but rather because they view him as more reasonable than his late brother and more open to their influence. If Amin does not satisfy their often conflicting interests, they can be expected to withdraw their support. ☐

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The Tasks Ahead

Events since his inauguration have illustrated the magnitude of the challenges facing Amin and the narrow confines within which he must work. After extensive consultations on the composition of his government, during which he was unable to reconcile conflicting pressures, Jumayyil was forced to carry over former Prime Minister Wazzan and install a cabinet of academics, lawyers, and other professionals, none of whom have had much political experience. ☐

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This arrangement is probably only a transitional one, aimed at postponing a decision on power-sharing among confessional groups while Jumayyil tackles more pressing diplomatic and security problems. Most of the political factions seem content to go along with this for now. US officials believe Jumayyil favors the formation of a strong central government under Maronite hegemony as a means of overcoming the internal inertia that he sees contributing to the country's problems. He has publicly stated that the longterm security interests of Lebanon's

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25X1 Christians lie not in the continuation of de facto partition, but in a united Lebanon. [redacted]

Expanding Central Authority

25X1 Meanwhile, Lebanon lacks the kind of strong government needed to expand central authority throughout the country. The army is also weak, having never really recovered from the civil war when it fragmented along confessional lines. Although it has since been reformed as an integrated Christian-Muslim force, the rebuilding process has been slow and Lebanese leaders have been reluctant to test it in situations where ethnic loyalties might again divide it. [redacted]

As a first step, the army has been sent in to demilitarize Beirut. In part a confidence-building measure, the move has not been without controversy. Search operations and arrests, initially limited to predominantly Muslim West Beirut, have led to charges that the army has acted like an occupation force and served Christian interests. While Muslims generally favor the goal of disarming extralegal militias that have controlled West Beirut since the civil war, they insist that the Christian Phalange military force must also be disarmed. Jumayyil has promised that this will be done. His delay in carrying through on this commitment, however, probably reflects an inability to assert control over the militia leadership, which is determined to preserve its strong role in Lebanon. [redacted]

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Withdrawal of Foreign Forces

25X1 Jumayyil is committed to securing the withdrawal of Syrian, Palestinian, and Israeli forces from Lebanon. Because of the weakness of Lebanon's institutions, especially the army, this goal can only be achieved through a combination of international political pressure and a strong military peacekeeping presence. While Lebanon can work toward negotiated settlements with Syria and Israel, Amin has no leverage with them. Nor has it any way to evict Palestinian fighters in the north, a problem Damascus insists must be resolved directly by the Lebanese government and the PLO. [redacted]

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25X1 The presence of the multinational force has been critical for the Lebanese Army to succeed in the pacification of Beirut. Jumayyil recognizes that the MNF will be essential in order to extend the authority of the central government beyond Beirut. During the period required to rebuild the armed forces, Jumayyil will want an expanded mandate for the multinational force, or for Unifil if need be, to accomplish this task. [redacted]

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25X1 [REDACTED]

Relations with Syria and Israel

Israel has dropped for now its insistence on a peace treaty, but still wants a written security agreement covering the 40 kilometer zone in the south. It may be difficult to formulate an agreement that will be satisfactory to the Israelis and at the same time not alienate the Lebanese Muslims whose support Jumayyil is trying to retain. Israel is contemptuous of the Unifil forces stationed in the south, and may be cool to any other international force unless its mandate for maintaining order is broader and it includes US troops. Defense Minister Sharon has made it clear that only forces Israel controls or in which the Israelis have complete confidence can be counted on to adequately patrol the security zone. The Israelis will probably keep up pressure for a statement or agreement on non-belligerency, looking ultimately toward a treaty. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1 Syria is displaying a cautious but positive attitude toward Amin. Adamantly opposed to the election of Bashir, [REDACTED]

25X1 [REDACTED] Syria now appears willing to normalize its relations with Lebanon, so long as Syrian interests are taken into account. Syria has agreed to proposals adopted in Fez to withdraw its troops from Lebanon. It is insisting that Israel must withdraw first, but in the end would probably accept a simultaneous pullout. [REDACTED]

25X1

Jumayyil's Goals in the US

Amin Jumayyil will be seeking both material and symbolic returns from his Washington visit. He hopes for tangible achievements in order to establish his legitimacy, especially with hardline elements of the Phalange militia. [REDACTED]

25X1

Amin would like to bind the US to Lebanon through a continuing commitment to his country's unity and sovereignty. [REDACTED]

25X1 [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1 This attitude is generated not only by his desire for material assistance from the US, but also by his need for a strong political buffer against the internal and external forces that traditionally have compromised the initiatives of the central government. [REDACTED]

Rebuilding the Lebanese Army

25X1 Essential to Amin's hopes for the future is a vastly strengthened Lebanese Army. [REDACTED]

25X1 [REDACTED]

25X1 [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Recruitment poses the major obstacle to the expansion of the LAF. Since the civil war the Lebanese government has attempted to maintain a balance between Christians and Muslims in the armed forces. Although the Defense Law of 1979 provided for national conscription, this provision has never been implemented. As a result, the arm relies upon volunteers. Recruits are easily obtained from among the poorer Muslim community, particularly the Shia'a. competition from the private sector and the fairly well organized Christian militias, however, has reduced the number of Christian recruits available to the army. []

25X1

Economic Assistance and Reconstruction

Jumayyil's ability to rebuild Lebanon's economy will be an important test of his political strength. According to one Lebanese business leader, reconstruction will cost roughly \$24 billion. Jumayyil will be accompanied on his visit by his newly appointed ministers for housing, and development and reconstruction. While they will be appealing to the World Bank and other donors for reconstruction aid, Jumayyil can be expected to make further overtures to the US to expand its current \$110 million commitment. []

25X1

American Security Guarantees

In addition to looking for a reaffirmation of the US commitment to secure the withdrawal of Israeli, Syrian and PLO forces from Lebanon, Jumayyil would like to create the aura of a quasi-US protectorate fully committed to Lebanon's political and territorial integrity. Moreover, Jumayyil hopes the US will prove to be an effective interlocutor with states such as Saudi Arabia from which he will need both political and economic support. []

25X1

25X1

The National Pact

At the time of independence in 1943, Lebanese leaders formulated a National Pact to guarantee the sectarian rights within the diverse population of Lebanon. An unwritten agreement, the Pact allocates political and administrative offices equitably among the recognized confessional groups according to the percentage of each in the total Lebanese population. Using the 1932 census as a base (none has been taken since then), the Presidency traditionally goes to a Maronite Christian, the prime ministership to a Sunni Muslim and the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies to a Shia Muslim. The 99 seats of the Chamber are also allocated proportionately among the religious communities.

Lebanese Politico-Religious Groups-1982

	Thousand Persons	Percent of Population
Lebanese		
Arab Muslims	1,150	44
Sunni	550	
Shia	600	
Arab Christians	750	28
Maronite	390	
Greek Orthodox	240	
Greek Catholic (Melkite)	52	
Protestant	68	
Druze	190	7
Non-Arabs	151	6
Armenian Orthodox/Catholic	150	
Jewish	1	
Palestinians (roughly one-third Arab Christian and two-thirds Arab Muslim)	400	15
Residents in Lebanon	2,641	100
Lebanese expatriates (people holding Lebanese citizenship or dual citizenship abroad, mostly in Western Hemisphere)	1,250	
Total	approximately 3.9 million	

President Jumayyil's Reconstruction Program

Goals: Jumayyil wants to prove he can run a strong and effective central government. His ability to rebuild the economy will be an important test of strength.

25X1

Costs: [redacted] estimates that reconstruction will cost roughly \$24 billion. Although Lebanese banks can finance a large part of this, they cannot go it alone.

Government role: Jumayyil must: maintain law and order so that Lebanon's vigorous private sector can get on with rebuilding; restore essential public services--roads, water, etc; help rebuild homes and commercial buildings. One guess is that 25 percent of the buildings in West Beirut are damaged or destroyed.

Progress: The private sector is already clearing rubble and reopening for business. Government reconstruction efforts have not yet begun. Jumayyil is asking for money from the US, World Bank, Arabs and others to get started.

Obstacles: Lebanese bankers will be reluctant to lend to the private sector unless they are confident that their investments will not be destroyed in more fighting. A World Bank role will be important in persuading other countries to donate. But the Bank will only lend if Lebanon already has a strong central government that controls the entire country. The Arabs are long on promises but short on delivery. They do not want Beirut to compete with their own financial centers.

US concerns: Jumayyil wants the Palestinians to leave Lebanon altogether, and is reluctant to rebuild the shattered refugee camps. However, we have insisted that our aid go to Palestinians as well as Lebanese. Winter is coming in Lebanon and thousands of Palestinians are still homeless.

US Aid: We have committed \$110 million, including \$30 million in guaranteed housing loans and \$10 million reserved for reconstruction in West Beirut.

Lebanese Crisis Chronology:

April 1975	Civil War begins. Shooting of a Christian Phalangist by Palestinian and retaliatory Phalangist ambush of Palestinian school bus triggered full scale fighting in Lebanon.
May 1976	Elias Sarkis elected President of Lebanon to succeed Sulayman Franjiyah; he was not installed in office until September 23, 1976 because Franjiyah would not step down early.
June 1976	Syrian troops intervened in Lebanon as peacekeeping force.
October 1976	Riyadh and Cairo Summits of heads of Arab states arranged an end to hostilities in Lebanon and created 30,000 man Arab Deterrent Force to police ceasefire.
March 1978	Israeli forces invaded southern Lebanon in retaliation for Palestinian terrorist attacks--"Litani operation".
June 1978	UNIFIL arrived to take up position in southern Lebanon under the agreement for Israeli withdrawal.
July 1978	Israelis withdraw from Lebanon.
July 1980	Phalange defeats Camille Shamun's National Liberal Party militia; virtually eliminates rival Christian militias and allows Phalange to emerge as dominant Christian force in Lebanon.
May-July 1981	Israeli shelling of Palestinian targets in southern Lebanon in retaliation for Palestinian rocketing of northern Israel.
July 24 1981	Ceasefire arranged by Ambassador Habib.
April 3, 1982	Israeli diplomat assassinated in France by unknown assailant.
May 9, 1982	Israeli aircraft make first airstrikes against Palestinian bases in southern Lebanon since ceasefire. Palestinians retaliate by shelling northern Israeli settlements.
June 3, 1982	Attempted assassination against Israeli Ambassador to London.
June 6, 1982	Israeli ground forces invade southern Lebanon.

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THE MAIN LEBANESE POLITICAL GROUPS

Independent Muslims

- Al Amal
Imam Musa Sadr; missing since September 1978 and Nabih Barri; Shia
- Islamic Coalition
Sa'ib Salam and Rashid Karami; Sunni
- Islamic Grouping
Shafiq Wazzan; Sunni
- Democratic Socialist Party
Kamal al-Assad; Shia
- "National Movement"
(Primarily Muslim Left)
 - Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)
Walid Junblat; Druze
 - Independent Nasirite Movement (Murabitun)
Ibrahim Qulaylat; Beirut Sunni
 - Communist Action Organization
Muhsin Ibrahim; extreme left Shia
 - Communist Party of Lebanon
Nicola Shawi and George Hawi; pro-USSR
Greek Orthodox Christian
 - Baath Party-Iraqi Wing
Abd al-Majid Rafai; Sunni
 - Nasirite Corrective Movement
Isam al-Arab; extreme left Sunni
 - Syrian Social Nationalist Party (PPS or SSNP)
Inam Raad; left Greek Orthodox Christian
 - Popular Nasserist Organization
Mustafa Sa'ad; Sunni
 - Baath Party-Syrian Wing
Assam Qansu; Sunni, pro Syrian
 - Arab Socialist Union
Abd al-Rahim Murad; Sunni

National Front

- (Pro-Syrian Left)
 - Nasirite Organization
(Union of Working Peoples Forces)
Kamal Shatila; Sunni
 - National Confrontation Front
Talal Marhabi and Ali 'Id; Tripoli-based Alawites

Moderate Christians

- Independent Parliamentary Bloc
Sim'an al-Duwayhi and Butrus Harb; Maronite
- Pro-Syrian Christians
 - Zgharta Front
Sulayman Franjiyah; Conservative
northern Maronite
- "Lebanese Front"
(Primarily Christian Right)
 - Phalange Party (Kataib)
Pierre Jumayyil and Amin Jumayyil
Maronite and Greek Catholic
 - National Liberal Party
Camille Shamun (President of Lebanese Front); Maronite
 - Kaslik Front
(Order of Maronite Monks) Bulus Na'man, Maronite
Clergy, extreme right
 - Guardians of the Cedars
Etienne Saqr AKA Abu Arz; extremist Maronite
 - Al Tanzim
George Adnan; extremist Maronite
- Independent Christian Right
 - Maronite League
Shakir Abu Sulayman; Maronite
 - National Bloc
Raymond Edde; Maronite, anti-Syrian
 - Free Lebanon Movement
Major Sa'ad Haddad, Maronite/Shia, pro-Israeli

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